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Abstract
Background: Quantification of the transmission dynamics of smallpox is crucial for optimizing
intervention strategies in the event of a bioterrorist attack. This article reviews basic methods and
findings in mathematical and statistical studies of smallpox which estimate key transmission
parameters from historical data.
Main findings: First, critically important aspects in extracting key information from historical data
are briefly summarized. We mention different sources of heterogeneity and potential pitfalls in
utilizing historical records. Second, we discuss how smallpox spreads in the absence of
interventions and how the optimal timing of quarantine and isolation measures can be determined.
Case studies demonstrate the following. (1) The upper confidence limit of the 99th percentile of
the incubation period is 22.2 days, suggesting that quarantine should last 23 days. (2) The highest
frequency (61.8%) of secondary transmissions occurs 3–5 days after onset of fever so that infected
individuals should be isolated before the appearance of rash. (3) The U-shaped age-specific case
fatality implies a vulnerability of infants and elderly among non-immune individuals. Estimates of the
transmission potential are subsequently reviewed, followed by an assessment of vaccination effects
and of the expected effectiveness of interventions.
Conclusion: Current debates on bio-terrorism preparedness indicate that public health decision
making must account for the complex interplay and balance between vaccination strategies and
other public health measures (e.g. case isolation and contact tracing) taking into account the
frequency of adverse events to vaccination. In this review, we summarize what has already been
clarified and point out needs to analyze previous smallpox outbreaks systematically.
Background
Smallpox epidemiology has the longest and richest his-
tory in investigating the mechanisms of spread and in
evaluating the effectiveness of vaccination [1,2]. Modern
epidemiological methods have developed in parallel with
smallpox control practice, and consequently, the disease
had already been eradicated before statistical and epide-
miological techniques for analyzing infectious disease
outbreaks had sufficiently matured.
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Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2008, 5:20 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/5/1/20Although the world is free from smallpox, researchers
continue revisiting smallpox epidemiology and virology
with recent techniques. In the aftermath of the 9-11-2001
attack, the awareness of the threat of bioterrorism has
grown significantly [3]. Mathematical models and com-
puter simulations have been developed to design and
optimize public health measures against re-introduced
variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox [4-17]. These
models are based on different epidemiological assump-
tions of smallpox. For example, assumptions about the
number of secondary transmissions before onset of illness
had not been not carefully validated in earlier mathemat-
ical modelling studies [16,17]. Accordingly, the policy
implications of these models differed widely, and thus the
necessity arose to capture the basic mechanisms of small-
pox transmission precisely [6,18]. To date, it has been
demonstrated that transmission dynamics and interven-
tion strategies cannot be modelled without sufficiently
quantifying the detailed intrinsic mechanisms by using
observed data [6,19,20]. Because of the global eradica-
tion, we have had to maximize the use of historical data
to estimate nearly all biological and epidemiological
parameters that are needed to optimize interventions
[21].
This review article has two purposes. The first purpose is
to summarize the issues that have been clarified in recent
mathematical and statistical studies and to discuss the rel-
evant policy implications. The second purpose is to spec-
ify what important aspects of smallpox epidemiology
remain unknown and to suggest how these could be
addressed by analyzing historical records. In the following
section, we first give a technical overview of the use of his-
torical data and then present some examples of quantifi-
cation. Subsequently, we summarize the basic concept
and interpretation of the transmission potential and the
resulting implications for vaccination strategies. The
paper concludes with a summary of the findings, empha-
sizing the importance of systematically analyzing histori-
cal datasets.
Review
Extracting key information from historical data
Although historical data have frequently been revisited
using modern statistical techniques to identify epidemio-
logical determinants of smallpox, many key issues remain
unknown in spite of great efforts. To clarify important
aspects of smallpox epidemiology, it remains necessary to
maximize the use of historical data. To understand their
usefulness and to avoid common pitfalls, we briefly dis-
cuss technical issues in utilizing historical publications.
Issues to consider when looking at historical smallpox data
In the following, we list key points to be remembered
whenever we statistically extract information from the his-
torical literature. As we may not be able to find all the
answers to the following questions in a single historical
data set, we may have to combine different data sets or to
merge in information from laboratory experiments.
(A) Were all cases caused by variola virus?
As cases could not be confirmed virologically before the
middle of the 20th century, it is crucial to know on what
observations historical diagnoses were based. It was not
uncommon to misdiagnose chickenpox cases as smallpox
[22,23]. In the older literature, it sometimes even remains
unclear which kind of "plague" was being described
[24,25]. Ascertainment of diagnostic methods is one of
the biggest challenges in utilizing historical outbreak data.
(B) Clinical documentations and time-varying medical trends
Similarly, clinical classifications of smallpox have been
revised over time [1,26-28]. The definition of severe
smallpox has varied greatly even in the 20th century. Vac-
cines have continuously been improved [29], and we still
do not even know from where the vaccinia virus emerged
and when it started to be used as a smallpox vaccine [30].
It is necessary to identify and to select the most useful
sources of literature, in order to understand which classi-
fication in a given publication was adopted and which
type of vaccine was most likely to have been used in the
population described.
(C) Pathogenicity and virulence of the variola virus
Classically, smallpox was classified into two different
types according to the observed case fatality. The tradi-
tional form of smallpox, referred to as variola major, was
believed to have a case fatality of 20% or more. A milder
form of the disease, variola minor, with a case fatality of
1% or less was first reported in the late 19th century in
South Africa, then it was observed in European countries
and finally in Brazil [1,31-33]. Variola minor accounted
for the majority of cases in the early 20th century in the
United States, where it remained the only form of small-
pox from the 1930s until its eradication [34]. The epide-
miology of variola minor and its interplay with variola
major have only partly been clarified [35,36]. There are
clear genetic differences between variola major and
minor, supporting the taxonomic distinction; recently,
the virulence of variola virus has also been attributed to
detailed genomic information [37,38]. However, if case
fatality was a major criterion in determining the virulence
of variola virus, the outcome of these laboratory studies
may have been distorted by the vaccination history of
cases and maybe also by other factors. Epidemiological
clarification of this point still remains an open question.
(D) Definition of the reported events
When extracting information on the incubation and infec-
tious periods (or similar parameters describing the epide-Page 2 of 12
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time of infection (which cannot be observed directly) and
the onset of disease were defined. There were two tradi-
tional ways to define the onset of smallpox: onset of fever
or appearance of rash. If the period from onset to recovery
is documented, it is important furthermore to identify
what "recovery" stands for (e.g. recovery from pyrexia or
solidification/disappearance of rash).
Extracting data from historical publications
The foregoing list does not cover all common pitfalls.
Tackling historical data requires not only statistical tech-
niques, but also understanding of the social history and
the background of the cases. Moreover, as noted above,
we often have to draw conclusions with implications for
public health decision-making using combined data from
different sources. Identifying the most useful and impor-
tant data and addressing key questions are major parts of
an essential process to shed light on the mechanisms of
transmission and spread of smallpox. In the next two sec-
tions, we review studies on parameter estimation that use
historical records and predominantly originate from our
previous studies. The following case studies were con-
ducted, carefully accounting for common technical prob-
lems as listed above when looking at the historical data.
Intrinsic transmission process of smallpox
To understand the spread of smallpox, it is essential to
know the intrinsic transmission process, i.e. after what
time symptoms appear, when secondary transmission
occurs, and how severe the disease will be. Although basic,
such knowledge of the intrinsic transmission process
already allows us to assess whether public health interven-
tions in the event of a bioterrorist attack can contain
smallpox by means of mass vaccination or by a combina-
tion of contact tracing, quarantine and isolation [6,19]. As
practical examples, here we briefly discuss basic method-
ologies and recent findings concerning the incubation
period, the infectious period and the case fatality.
Incubation period of smallpox
The incubation period is defined as the time from infec-
tion to onset of disease [39]. Usually, symptoms of small-
pox appear 10–14 days after infection [40]. The
knowledge of the incubation period distribution enables
us to determine the appropriate length of quarantine [41].
'Quarantine' here refers to physical separation of healthy
individuals who were exposed to cases. In the practice of
outbreak investigations, the time of exposure is some-
times determined by contact tracing. Historically, the sug-
gested length of smallpox quarantine tended to be 14–16
days, based on professional experience and an accumula-
tion of epidemiological data, but not on an explicit statis-
tical analysis of the incubation period distribution.
Restricting the movement of exposed individuals for
longer than the maximum incubation period ensures the
effectiveness of quarantine measures. Unfortunately, the
length of the incubation period requires knowing the
exact time of infection, and thus can only be determined
for cases who were exposed for a very short period of time.
In addition, the maximum observed incubation period
clearly depends on the sample size: the larger the sample
size, the more likely we are to find cases whose incubation
periods exceed the previously known maximum. The
number of smallpox cases with well-known incubation
period (e.g. documented patients who had been exposed
for a single day only) is limited in historical records. The
problem of stating a maximum incubation period can be
circumvented by fitting a statistical distribution to the
data. This distribution allows a time point to be deter-
mined beyond which the onset of further cases becomes
extremely unlikely (e.g. the time after infection until
which 99% of the patients develop symptoms). If the
incubation period follows a lognormal distribution with
mean, μ, and standard deviation, σ (of the variable's log-
arithm), the probability density of observing an incuba-
tion period of length ti is given by
We can estimate the parameters μ and σ from a dataset of
n known incubation times ti by maximizing the likelihood
function
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the incuba-
tion period of smallpox, which was estimated from 131
cases of smallpox who were exposed only for a single day
[42]. The mean incubation period is 12.5 days (SD 2.2
days). The 99th percentile is 18.6 days with a 95% confi-
dence interval (CI) ranging from 16.8 to 22.2 days. This
indicates that a quarantine of 23 days ensures that more
than 99% of infected individuals will develop symptoms
before being released.
Infectious period of smallpox
The infectious period has traditionally been defined as the
period in which pathogens are discharged [43]. It pres-
ently refers to the period in which infected individuals are
capable of generating secondary cases. Knowledge of the
infectious period allows us to determine for how long
known cases need to be isolated and what should be the
latest time point after exposure at which newly infected
individuals should be in isolation.
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the pathogen load changes over time using the most sen-
sitive microbiological techniques (e.g. polymerase chain
reaction), but such observations are usually limited to the
period after onset of symptoms. Several attempts have
been made to measure the distribution of the virus-posi-
tive period of smallpox cases [44,45], but sample sizes
were small and only very few samples could be obtained
during the early stage of illness. Moreover, linking "virus-
positive" results to the probability of causing secondary
transmission is difficult without further information (e.g.
frequency, mode and degree of contact).
Another way of addressing this complicated issue is to
determine the frequency of secondary transmission rela-
tive to disease-age, i.e. the time since onset of fever [46].
An estimate of the relative infectiousness is obtained by
analyzing historical data in which it is known who
acquired infection from whom. The known transmission
network permits serial intervals to be extracted, i.e. the
times from symptom onset in a primary case to symptom
onset in a secondary case [47-49]. Given the length of the
serial interval s and the corresponding length of the incu-
bation period f, the disease-age l from onset of symptoms
to secondary transmission satisfies
s = l + f (3)
Considering the statistical distributions for each length
results in a convolution equation:
The frequency l(t-τ) of secondary transmission relative to
disease-age can be back-calculated by extracting the serial
interval distribution s(t) from a known transmission net-
work, and by using the incubation period distribution f(τ)
given above. If we have information on the length ti of the
serial interval for n cases, the likelihood function is given
by
The parameters that describe the frequency of secondary
transmission relative to disease-age can be estimated by
maximizing this function. A similar method has been
applied to estimate the number of HIV-infections from
AIDS incidence [50].
Figure 2 shows the back-calculated infectiousness of
smallpox relative to disease-age [46]. In the following text,
day 0 represents the onset of fever. Before onset of fever
(i.e. between day -5 and day -1) altogether only 2.7% of
all transmissions occurred. Between day 0 and day 2 (i.e.
in the prodromal period before the onset of rash) a total
of 21.1% of all transmissions occurred. The daily fre-
quency of passing on the infection was highest between
day 3 and day 5, yielding a total of 61.8% of all transmis-
sions. These estimates help determine the latest time by
which cases should be in isolation. If each primary case
infects on average six individuals, and if the effectiveness
of isolation is 100%, the isolation of a primary case before
the onset of rash reduces the expected number of victims
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Incubation period distribution of smallpox fitted to a lognor-mal distribution (n = 131)Figure 1
Incubation period distribution of smallpox fitted to a 
lognormal distribution (n = 131). The vertical arrow 
indicates the maximum likelihood estimate of the 99th per-
centile of the incubation period [42]. The median and the 
coefficient of variation are 12.5 days and 18.0%, respectively.
Relative frequency of secondary transmissions of smallpox by disease-agFigur  2
Relative frequency of secondary transmissions of 
smallpox by disease-age. Expected daily frequency of sec-
ondary transmissions with corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals [46]. The percentages indicate the fraction of trans-
missions among all transmissions that occurred in the given 
intervals. The disease-age t = 0 denotes the onset of fever.Page 4 of 12
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therefore, substantially reduce the number of secondary
cases, and the outbreak could quickly be brought under
control by additional countermeasures (e.g. contact trac-
ing [6,51]).
Case fatality
Case fatality is the proportion of deaths among those
developing the disease. It is particularly important to
understand the case fatality of smallpox in order to esti-
mate the magnitude of the disaster in the event of a bio-
terrorist attack. It may also be of practical importance to
predict the burden of hospital admissions and burials in
such an event. The case fatality of smallpox was systemat-
ically reviewed during the Eradication Programme [52],
showing extremely high crude estimates of 26% and 36%
in East-Pakistan and Madras, respectively, but suggesting
a wide geographical heterogeneity. Recent studies attrib-
uted part of this heterogeneity to viral genomic differences
[37,38], but many of the previously published mathemat-
ical models simply assumed an overall estimate of 30%
for unvaccinated cases.
Various factors influence case fatality, most importantly
previous vaccination history (which will be discussed in
the Section on public health interventions) and the age at
infection. Following a previous study by Dietz and
Heesterbeek [53], we assume the following parametric
model for the age-specific case fatality of smallpox:
c(a) = α exp(-βa) + γ(1 - exp(-δa))2 (6)
where α, β, γ and δ are parameters that need to be esti-
mated. If we have a dataset with Mi deaths and Ni survivors
of age ai, the likelihood function is
where ai is a mid-point of age group i. Figure 3 shows age-
specific case fatality estimates of unvaccinated cases in
Verona, Italy, from 1810–38 and Sheffield, UK, from
1887–88, respectively [54,55]. The age-specific case fatal-
ity of smallpox can be depicted as a U-shaped curve that
peaks in infancy and in old age. Smallpox case fatality also
depends on other biological factors of the host such as
pregnancy [56], which increases the case fatality from
12.7% (estimate for non-pregnant healthy adults; 95% CI:
11.2–14.3) to 34.3% (95% CI: 31.4–37.1) [57]. Underly-
ing diseases (e.g. cancer, diabetes mellitus, HIV infection
and medical immunosuppression for transplantation)
could further increase the case fatality.
Above, we have presented the three most important com-
ponents of the intrinsic transmission process. Each of
them plays a key role in determining the optimal interven-
tion strategy. We showed some basic applications of uti-
lizing likelihood functions [58], but various other
statistical approaches have been taken which were moti-
vated by similar epidemiological interests. These include
L c a c ai
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Age-specific case fatality of smallpoxFigure 3
Age-specific case fatality of smallpox. Observed (grey bars) and fitted (continuous line) age-specific case fatalities of 
unvaccinated cases in (A) Verona, Italy, 1810–1838 [53,55] and (B) Sheffield, UK, 1887–8 [54].Page 5 of 12
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sian techniques [60].
Transmission potential
In addition to the epidemiological parameters that char-
acterize the natural history of smallpox, we have to know
the most important summary measure of transmission,
the basic reproduction number, R0, in order to design and
optimize public health interventions. R0 is defined as the
average number of secondary cases arising from a single
index case in a fully susceptible population in the absence
of interventions [61,62]. Here, we discuss the concept of
R0 and its estimation, starting with its historical develop-
ment. Then we use the basic reproduction number to
assess the eradication threshold of smallpox by means of
mass vaccination.
R0 and vaccination
Smallpox is the disease with the longest history in theoret-
ical modelling. During the 18th century, the famous
mathematician Daniel Bernoulli modelled the spread of
smallpox and assessed the effectiveness of the variolation
practice (variolation was the precursor of vaccination,
consisting of the inoculation of variola virus) [53,63].
Moreover, the earliest formulation and calculation of R0
may have been stimulated by smallpox [64]. The earliest
concept of R0 and the relevant insights into the effective-
ness of smallpox vaccination are revisited in the follow-
ing.
Figure 4a shows the result of the simple mathematical
model developed by Theophil Lotz in the late 19th cen-
tury [64]. If a single primary case generates on average R0
= 2 secondary cases, and if we ignore for the sake of sim-
plicity the depletion of susceptible individuals, the
number of cases grows geometrically. If there are a index
cases in generation 0, the expected numbers of cases in
generations 1, 2, 3, ..., n will be
respectively. Following Lotz's example of R0 = 2, and
assuming a single index case (a = 1), we expect 2, 4, 8, ...,
2n cases in the subsequent generations. Although the
model ignores variations in the number of secondary
transmissions (which are deemed particularly important
for directly transmitted diseases [65]), the process
described reasonably captures the essential dynamics of
transmission during the early stages of an epidemic.
We now move on to describe various attempts to estimate
R0, summarized in Table 1 together with the underlying
key assumptions. Whereas an analysis of long-term tem-
poral dynamics using a mathematical model suggested
widely varying estimates of R0, ranging from 3.5 to 6.0
[66], stochastic models assuming a homogeneous pattern
of spread, but ignoring the pre-existing immunity level in
the afflicted population, grossly underestimated R0 as
slightly above unity [67]. A revised estimate by a model
that accounts for the detailed intrinsic dynamics of small-
pox in an initially partially immune population suggested
that R0 is in the order of 6.9 (95% CI: 4.5, 10.1) [18]. This
roughly corresponds to an R0 for which 80–90% of vacci-
nation coverage would allow sufficient herd immunity to
be achieved [68,69] (i.e., population-based protection of
unvaccinated individuals due to the presence of vacci-
nated individuals), similarly to Bernoulli's early model,
which yielded an estimate of the force of infection that
can be translated to R0 = 6.7 [53].
R0 plays a key role in determining the critical vaccination
coverage in a randomly mixing population [70]. If v =
80% of individuals are protected by vaccination, the aver-
age number of secondary cases is reduced to 20%. Follow-
ing the model of Lotz, the number of cases in each
generation is
Figure 4b shows the growth of cases when v = 50% are
protected by vaccination: only a single case is expected in
each generation (for R0 = 2). The number of cases
decreases from one generation to the next if (1-v)R0 is less
than 1 (cf. equation (9)). In line with this, we can formu-
late the most fundamental condition of immunization to
aR aR aRn0 0
2
0, , , ,  ...   (8)
a v R a v R a v Rn n( ) , ( ) ,..., ( )1 1 10
2
0
2
0− − −
(9)
Theoretical initial courses of smallpox outbreaks following a geometri  growthFigu  4
Theoretical initial courses of smallpox outbreaks fol-
lowing a geometric growth. A. The infection tree (i.e. 
transmission network) of smallpox is shown by generation, 
following equation (8). For simplicity, R0 is assumed to be 2. 
B. Infection tree under vaccination. Vaccination is assumed to 
reduce the number of secondary transmission by 50%, and 
thus only 1 case in each generation is expected.Page 6 of 12
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to eradicate an infectious disease by vaccination, the frac-
tion protected by vaccination must satisfy [71]
If R0 is 6 for smallpox, more than 1-1/6 = 83.3% of suscep-
tible individuals need to be successfully immunized to
prevent an epidemic by vaccination alone. Although the
pattern of smallpox spread is most probably non-random,
equation (10) can be used as an approximation to guide
policymaking. If all individuals are vaccinated, v can be
interpreted as the direct effectiveness of vaccination
[72,73]. The effectiveness of smallpox vaccination
remained controversial during the early 20th century,
partly because of a lack of reliable estimation methods [2],
but the methodologies have greatly improved since then
[74-78]. During the late 19th century, when vaccine qual-
ity was not always ensured, the crude overall effectiveness
of vaccination seems to have been higher than 85%
[1,21].
Heterogeneity and behavioural change in relation to 
historical data
To predict the course and size of an epidemic appropri-
ately, it is critically important to clarify the heterogeneity
of transmission. The above-mentioned critical coverage
for eradication assumes a randomly mixing population,
but it has been established that smallpox spreads for
example more easily within households than in the com-
munity [79-82]. A theoretical approach to modelling
household and community transmission separately has
been described [14,83], and a tool that allows the two dif-
ferent levels of transmission to be estimated has been
developed [84], but it is very difficult to obtain the neces-
sary estimates from the limited information given in his-
torical records (e.g. detailed household transmission data
are always distorted by vaccination). Age-related heteroge-
neity is yet another important determinant of smallpox
epidemiology [85], and spatial patterns of transmission
can also influence the success of interventions [86].
Unfortunately, historical records, especially those
recorded during the Intensified Smallpox Eradication Pro-
gramme, are considerably biased (e.g. by individual vacci-
nation histories), and thus it is difficult to address age-
related and spatial heterogeneities.
Behavioural changes during an outbreak also have to be
clarified to model a bioterrorist attack realistically. It has
been suggested that the frequency of contact decreases
after the information on an ongoing epidemic is widely
disseminated [87-89]. A mathematical model that
attempted to incorporate such a declining contact fre-
quency during an epidemic suggested that even gradual
and moderate behavioural changes could drastically slow
the epidemic [90]. Methods incorporating such changes
remain yet to be developed to help public health policy
making. A generalized method could perhaps incorporate
results of a psychological response survey [91].
Public health interventions
Given the basic parameters that describe the intrinsic
transmission process, we are now able to examine the
effectiveness of interventions. In addition to the critical
level of mass vaccination that was discussed in the previ-
ous section, here we discuss further issues on vaccination
strategies and other public health interventions in bioter-
rorism preparedness.
Duration of vaccine-induced immunity and partial 
protection
The degree of protection of vaccinated individuals in the
present population is yet another important public health
issue. Immunological studies showed that a fraction of
previously vaccinated individuals still reacts to exposure
with variola virus [92,93], but it is difficult to attribute
each kind of immunological response to actual protection
against the disease and its severity. Thus, the degree of
protection of individuals who were vaccinated 30 to 50
years ago has remained an open question.
As we have previously shown, an epidemiological model
that partly addressed the effect of booster events estimated
that primary vaccination protected for a median duration
of 11.7 to 28.4 years against the disease [94], indicating
that most vaccinated individuals in the present commu-
nity may no longer be protected from contracting small-
v
R
> −1
1
0
(10)
Table 1: Reported estimates of R0 for smallpox
Location R0 Range (min, max) Assumptions
Unspecified [68,69] 5.0 - Calculated from proposed goal of vaccination coverage
Abakaliki, Nigeria, 1967 [67] 1.1 (1.0, 1.2)‡ Population mixes randomly, initially fully susceptible
Various outbreaks in Europe and the US, 18–20th centuries 
[66]
3.5–6.0 (3.4, 10.8) Population mixes randomly, initially fully susceptible
Paris, 17th century [53] 6.7 - Population is fully susceptible at birth
Abakaliki, Nigeria, 1967 [18] 6.9 (4.5, 10.1)‡ Initially partially immune, heterogeneous mixing
‡The ranges for the outbreak in Abakaliki are 95% confidence intervals.Page 7 of 12
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vaccinated individuals are still protected against severe
manifestations and death from smallpox [95]. An analysis
of a statistical record of an outbreak in Liverpool from
1902–3 revealed a median duration of protection against
smallpox death of 49.2 years (95% CI: 42.0–57.3)
[95,96]. This finding (of long-lasting partial protection
from severe manifestations) was further supported by sta-
tistical analyses of similar historical datasets [94] and of
individual case records extracted from historical out-
breaks in Australia where booster events were extremely
rare [97]. In the event of a bioterrorist attack in the early
21st century, residual immunity could significantly
decrease the individual burden of disease. However, the
persistence of partial protection does not necessarily
imply a positive impact on the population level. Masked
symptoms may cause difficulties in case recognition and
clinical diagnosis. Although it might be virologically plau-
sible that previously vaccinated cases are less infectious
(e.g. due to low levels of virus in their nasopharynx),
reduced severity may also permit movements of infectious
individuals, worsening the prospects of public health con-
trol. The ripple benefit of residual immunity has yet to be
clarified.
To understand the complex interplay of all partial effects
of vaccination, various biological and social effects must
be considered. In theory, vaccination does not only
diminish the susceptibility of vaccinated individuals, but
also reduces the degree and duration of infectiousness
upon infection. The vaccine-induced reduction of infec-
tiousness can be estimated using the household secondary
attack rate (SAR), expressed as the ratio of the number of
infected household contacts to the number of exposed
household contacts [98]. Suppose that SARij denotes the
household secondary attack rate where i and j, respec-
tively, give the previous vaccination histories of the sec-
ondary and primary case (i.e. i or j = 1 represents
previously vaccinated, whereas i or j = 0 represents unvac-
cinated individuals). Let us consider the following house-
hold transmission data, which were observed in India
[79]:
The household SAR caused by unvaccinated cases among
unvaccinated and vaccinated contacts were estimated to
be SAR00 = 40/650 = 0.0615 and SAR10 = 11/583 = 0.0189,
respectively. Those caused by vaccinated cases among
unvaccinated and vaccinated household contacts were
SAR01 = 10/499 = 0.0200 and SAR11 = 2/421 = 0.0048,
respectively.
The crude efficacy of vaccine in reducing susceptibility
VES, infectiousness VEI, and a combined effect of both VET
is then estimated by
If we make the simplifying assumption that the biological
effect of vaccination was identical for all vaccinated indi-
viduals, vaccination reduced susceptibility by 69.3%,
infectiousness by 67.4%, and the combined effect was
92.3%. Although an effect of vaccination on the duration
of disease has rarely been observed and reported, histori-
cal epidemiological studies in Dalian, China, suggested
that the mean symptomatic period was reduced by 13.7–
48.5% if the case was previously vaccinated [21,99].
Vaccination strategies
Given that the intrinsic dynamics as well as the effects of
vaccination are sufficiently quantified, vaccination strate-
gies against smallpox can be optimized. Three issues, of
which the epidemiology has been discussed though the
quantitative effect has not yet been fully clarified, are dis-
cussed in the following: revaccination, ring vaccination,
and post-exposure vaccination.
After it became clear in the late 19th century that vaccine
efficacy was not perfect and that vaccine-induced immu-
nity waned over time, revaccination was put into practice.
Revaccinated individuals were said to have contracted
smallpox less often and had much milder manifestations,
so that scheduled revaccinations became accepted in the
early to mid 20th century [26], but the intervals from pri-
mary vaccination to revaccinations and the number of
revaccinations varied widely within and between coun-
tries, making analytic evaluations very difficult. Accord-
ingly, it is extremely difficult to quantify the effectiveness
of revaccination in reducing the chance of smallpox even
with statistical techniques in the present day. Crude esti-
mates of the increased protection against smallpox death
were obtained for several outbreaks; e.g. for Madras dur-
ing the 1960s [27], where 87.1% fewer cases died in the
revaccinated group than in the group who had only
received the primary vaccination (770/3266 vs. 4/132
deaths, respectively), but this revaccination effect only
measures what happened to people who were infected in
spite of vaccination. (What makes an explicit interpreta-
tion of these findings even more difficult was the fact that
vaccination in India was made using the rotary lancet,
which left a scar even in the absence of "take".)
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finding: Ring vaccination is a surveillance containment
measure that consists of vaccinating and monitoring all
susceptible individuals in a prescribed area around one or
several index cases [100]. This combined strategy is
deemed more effective than mass vaccination [101], but
combinations of vaccination and public health measures
have not yet been explicitly evaluated. Ring vaccination
was introduced and evaluated mainly in West and Central
Africa and in Asia where it was always combined with case
isolation [102]. Although it is difficult to exclude the
impact of other interventions and to estimate the net
effectiveness of ring vaccination explicitly (e.g. the impact
of previous vaccinations can usually not be separated
[103]), accumulated experience during the Intensified
Eradication Programme strongly suggests that ring vacci-
nation (accompanied by vigorous isolation) worked well
[101]. The strategy is deemed logically effective in con-
taining localized outbreaks, but it is important to ensure
effective contact tracing if we are to rely on ring vaccina-
tion alone [9,104].
Vaccination may still be protective if a person has already
been exposed to the virus, a procedure referred to as post-
exposure vaccination [105,106]. Despite numerous dis-
cussions [107], the protective effect of post-exposure vac-
cination has remained unclear. A historical study from the
early 20th century suggests that vaccination within 7 days
after exposure is effective [28]. Smallpox textbooks in the
1960s and '70s claimed that 'vaccination within 72 hours
almost promises protection' [26,27], a statement roughly
consistent with a more recent statistical estimate based on
historical data and on several assumptions concerning the
hypothetical frequencies of vaccinated and protected indi-
viduals [108], and with a laboratory study demonstrating
a cell-mediated response within 4 days after exposure
[109]. A similar estimate was obtained in a Delphi analy-
sis, which concluded that post-exposure vaccination can
be assumed to be 80–93% effective during the first 3 days
after exposure and 2–25% thereafter [110]. However, as
we have shown, a statistical exercise demonstrates that
historical data, which only record cases who developed
smallpox after post-exposure vaccination, hardly provide
sufficient insight into the effectiveness of post-exposure
vaccination [111]. Information regarding the denomina-
tor is insufficient for the majority of records (i.e. we do not
know how many exposed people who were vaccinated
were protected from the disease). Only the effectiveness of
vaccination against severe disease upon infection can be
estimated from such data: the shorter the interval between
exposure and vaccination, the lower the probability of
developing severe smallpox. To the best of our knowl-
edge, only one outbreak in Leicester, UK, from 1903–04
provided insight into the protection against disease by
post-exposure vaccination [112]: counting from the erup-
tion of the index case, it was reported that none of 210
individuals (0%) who were vaccinated on the first day
after exposure, 2 among 359 (0.5%) who were vaccinated
on the second day, 5 among 102 (4.9%) who were vacci-
nated on the third day, and 10 among 116 (8.6%) who
were vaccinated on the fourth day or later developed the
disease. Although this seems to indicate some degree of
protection, the actual efficacy of post-exposure vaccina-
tion can only be determined by comparing these findings
to observations in a group of individuals who were
exposed for exactly the same periods of time, but refused
or were denied post-exposure vaccination.
Despite effective vaccination, pros and cons of vaccina-
tion practice always need to account for adverse events of
vaccination [113]. Vaccine-strain dependent differences
in the frequency of adverse events have been reported, and
the risk of death due to vaccination has been analyzed in
detail only recently [114,115]. Theoretical frameworks
reported to date agree with each other that we should not
implement pre-attack mass vaccination in order to mini-
mize the number of adverse events. Policy suggestions of
mathematical models for post-attack vaccination strate-
gies depend on the specific attack scenarios and need to be
investigated further.
Case isolation and contact tracing
Rather than relying completely on vaccination, recent
modelling studies have suggested that an outbreak could
be contained by a combination of case isolation and con-
tact tracing [6,14], owing mainly to the characteristics of
the intrinsic dynamics of smallpox (e.g. the relatively long
generation time and the clear symptoms of smallpox).
The importance of monitoring and controlling "contacts"
has been highlighted in a historical observation [112] and
was also stressed during the Eradication Programme
[51,116,117]. A public health system's capability in con-
ducting contact tracing may determine whether or not a
smallpox outbreak can be controlled without vaccination.
This should also take into account response logistics and
the limited number of public health practitioners [104]. A
mathematical exercise suggested that the optimal inter-
vention also depends on the initial attack size: whereas an
outbreak caused by few cases could easily be controlled by
isolation and contact tracing alone, regional (targeted)
mass vaccination is recommended if the initial attack size
is big and R0 is large [118].
Conclusion
This article has reviewed quantifications of the transmis-
sion and spread of smallpox using historical data.
Although historical data are limited and we cannot
answer all questions regarding smallpox epidemiology,
many publications are available from previous efforts.
However, a systematic listing of surveillance data and/orPage 9 of 12
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still remains a future task. It is essential that historians,
smallpox specialists and epidemiologists interact more.
Since the eradication, smallpox deaths have disappeared
from the world [119], and hope has arisen that we will
succeed in eradicating other infectious diseases. Owing to
the conceived threat of bioterrorism, researchers neverthe-
less have to continue working on smallpox, and we have
entered yet another round of discussing the pros and cons
of smallpox vaccination. The current debates of prepared-
ness issues are far more complex than mass vaccination,
and newer vaccination strategies complicate the balance
between individual and community benefits [120]. Once
other infectious diseases have been eradicated, we will see
similar discussions arise, but before this becomes the case,
it is important to make sure that systematically collected
data are aggregated and stored for posterity.
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